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QUINE’S INTERPRETATION PROBLEM AND THE EARLY
DEVELOPMENT OF POSSIBLE WORLDS SEMANTICS*
Sten Lindström
In this paper, I shall consider the challenge that Quine posed in 1947 to the
advocates of quantified modal logic to provide an explanation, or interpretation,
of modal notions that is intuitively clear, allows “quantifying in”, and does not
presuppose, mysterious, intensional entities. The modal concepts that Quine and
his contemporaries, e.g. Carnap and Ruth Barcan Marcus, were primarily con-
cerned with in the 1940’s were the notions of (broadly) logical, or analytical,
necessity and possibility, rather than the metaphysical modalities that have since
become popular, largely due to the influence of Kripke. In the 1950’s modal
logicians responded to Quine’s challenge by providing quantified modal logic
with model-theoretic semantics of various types. In doing so they also,
explicitly or implicitly addressed Quine’s interpretation problem. Here I shall
consider the approaches developed by Carnap in the late 1940’s, and by
Kanger, Hintikka, Montague, and Kripke in the 1950’s, and discuss to what
extent these approaches were successful in meeting Quine’s doubts about the
intelligibility of quantified modal logic.
1. Background: The search for the intended interpretation
Starting with the work of C. I. Lewis, an immense number of formal systems
of modal logic have been constructed based on classical propositional or
predicate logic. The originators of modern modal logic, however, were not very
clear about the intuitive meaning of the symbols M and N, except to say that
these should stand for some kind of necessity and possibility, respectively. For
instance, in Symbolic Logic (1932), Lewis and Langford write:
                                    
*Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at conferences and workshops in Uppsala,
Torun, Liblice, Leipzig, Donostia–San Sebastián, and Helsinki. I am grateful to the partici-
pants, especially Joseph Almog, Nicholas Asher, Johan van Benthem, Thorild Dahlquist,
Sven Danielsson, Jaakko Hintikka, J. M. Larrazabal, Pavel Materna, F. Migura, Stephen
Neale, Peter Pagin, Jeff Pelletier, Jerzy Perzanowski, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Tor Sandqvist,
Gabriel Sandu, Krister Segerberg, Rysiek Sliwinski, Heinrich Wansing, and Jan Österberg, for
helpful comments and advice.
2 STEN LINDSTRÖM
It should be noted that the words “possible”, “impossible” and “necessary” are
highly ambiguous in ordinary discourse. The meaning here assigned to Np is a
wide meaning of “possibility” – namely, logical conceivability or the absence of
self-contradiction. (pp. 160-61)
This situation early on led to a search for more rigorous interpretations of
modal notions. Gödel (1933) suggested interpreting the necessity operator M as
standing for provability (informal provability or, alternatively, formal provabil-
ity in a fixed formal system), a suggestion that subsequently led to the modern
provability interpretations of Solovay, Boolos and others.
After Tarski (1936a, b) had developed rigorous notions of satisfaction, truth
and logical consequence for classical extensional languages, the question arose
whether the same methods could be applied to the languages of modal logic and
related systems. One natural idea, that occurred to Carnap in the 1940’s, was to
let Mϕ be true of precisely those formulas ϕ that are logically valid (or logically
true) according to the standard semantic definition of logical validity. This idea
led him to the following semantic clause for the operator of logical necessity:
Mϕ is true in an interpretation I iff ϕ is true in every interpretation I’.
This type of approach, which we may call the validity interpretation, was pur-
sued by Carnap, using so-called state descriptions, and subsequently also by
Kanger (1957a, b) and Montague (1960), using Tarski-style model-theoretic
interpretations rather than state descriptions. In Hintikka’s and Kanger’s early
work on modal semantics other interpretations of M were also considered,
especially, epistemic (‘It is known that ϕ’) and deontic ones (‘It ought to be the
case that ϕ’). In order to study these and other non-logical modalities, the
introduction by Hintikka and Kanger of accessibility relations between possible
worlds (models, domains) was crucial.
2. Carnap’s formal semantics for quantified modal logic
Carnap’s project was not only to develop a semantics (in the sense of Tarski)
for intensional languages, but also to use metalinguistic notions from formal
semantics to throw light on the modal ones. In ‘Modalities and Quantification’
from 1946 he writes:
It seems to me ... that it is not possible to construct a satisfactory system before
the meaning of the modalities are sufficiently clarified. I further believe that this
clarification can best be achieved by correlating each of the modal concepts with a
corresponding semantical concept (for example, necessity with L-truth).
In (1946, 1947) Carnap presented a formal semantics for logical necessity
based on Leibniz’s old idea that a proposition is necessarily true if and only if it
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is true in all possible worlds. Suppose that we are considering a first-order
predicate language L with predicate symbols and individual constants, but no
function symbols. In addition to Boolean connectives, quantifiers and the iden-
tity symbol = (considered as a logical symbol), the language L also contains the
modal operator M for logical necessity. We assume that L comes with a domain
of individuals D and that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
individual constants of L and the individuals in D. Intuitively speaking, each
individual in D has exactly one individual constant as its (canonical) name. A
state description S for L is simply a set of (closed) atomic sentences of the
form P(a1,..., an), where P is an n-ary predicate in L and a1,..., an are individual
constants in L. Intuitively speaking, an n-ary predicate symbol (n ≥ 1)
represents an n-ary relation among individuals in D. An atomic sentence of the
form P(a1,..., an) represents the state-of-affairs of the relation represented by P
holding between the individuals denoted by a1,..., an (in that order). State
descriptions represent logically possible worlds. P(a1,..., an) ∈ S represents that
the relation P obtains between a1,..., an in the world represented by S. P(a1,...,
an) ∉ S represents the fact that the relation P doesn’t hold between a1,..., an in
the corresponding world.
In order to interpret quantification, Carnap introduced the notion of an indi-
vidual concept (relative to L): An individual concept is simply a function f
which assigns to every state description S an individual constant f(S) (repre-
senting an individual in D). Intuitively speaking, individual concepts are func-
tions from possible worlds to individuals. According to Carnap’s semantics,
individual variables are assigned values relative to state descriptions. An
assignment is a function g which to every state description S and every individ-
ual variable x assigns an individual constant g(x, S). Intuitively, g(x, S) repre-
sents the individual which is the value of x under the assignment g in the possi-
ble world represented by S. We may speak of g(x, S) as the value extension of
x in S relative to g. Analogously, the individual concept (λS)g(x, S) which
assigns to every state description S the value extension of x in S relative to g,
we call the value intension of x relative to g. Thus, according to Carnap’s
semantics a variable is assigned both a value intension and a value extension.
The value extension assigned to a variable in a state description S is simply the
value intension assigned to the variable applied to S.
With these notions in place, we can define what it means for a formula ϕ of
L to be true in a state description relative to an assignment g (in symbols,
S ‚  ϕ[g]).
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For atomic formulas of the form P(t1,..., tn), where t1,..., tn are individual
terms, i.e., variables or individual constants, we have:
(1) S ‚  P(t,..., tn)[g] iff P(S(t1, g)..., S(tn, g)) ∈ S.
Here, S(ti, g) is the extension of the term ti in the state description S relative to
the assignment g. Thus, if ti is an individual constant, then S(ti, g) is ti itself;
and if ti is a variable, then S(ti, g) = g(ti, S).
The semantic clause for the identity symbol is the following:
(2) S ‚  t1 = t2[g] iff S(t1, g) = S(t2, g).
That is, the identity statement t1 = t2 is true in a state description S relative to an
assignment g if and only if the terms t1 and t2 have the same extensions in S
relative to g.
The clauses for the Boolean connectives are the usual ones:
(3) S ‚  ¬ϕ[g] iff S ϕ[g],
(4) S ‚ (ϕ → ψ)[g] iff S ϕ[g] or S ‚  ψ[g].
Carnap’s clause for the universal quantifier is the following:
(5) S ‚  ∀xϕ[g] iff for every assignment g’ such that g =x g’,
S ‚  ϕ[g’].
Explanation: g’ is like g except possibly at x (also written, g =x g’) if and only
if, for each state description S’ and each variable y other than x, g’(y, S’) =
g(y, S’). Intuitively, g =x g’ means that the assignments g and g’ assign the
same value intensions to all the variables that are distinct from x and possibly
assign different value intensions to x. Intuitively, then ∀xϕ(x) may be read: “for
every assignment of an individual concept to x, ϕ(x)”.
Finally, the semantic clause for the necessity operator is the expected one:
(6) S ‚  Mϕ[g] iff, for every state-description S’, S’ ‚  ϕ[g].
That is, the modal formula ‘it is (logically) necessary that ϕ’ is true in a state-
description S (relative to an assignment g) if and only if ϕ is true in every state-
description S’ (relative to g).
A formula ϕ is true in a state description S (in symbols, S ‚  ϕ) if it is true in
S relative to every assignment. Logical truth (logical validity) is defined as truth
in all state-descriptions. We write ‚  ϕ for ϕ being logically true.
It is easy to verify that Carnap’s semantics satisfies the following principles:
(7) All truth-functional tautologies are logically true.
(8) The set of logical truths is closed under modus ponens.
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(9) The standard principles of quantification theory (without identity)
are valid. In particular, universal instantiation
∀xϕ(x) → ϕ(t/x) (where t is substitutable for x in ϕ)
holds without restrictions.
We also have, as expected:
(10) ‚  Mϕ iff ‚  ϕ,
(11) ‚  ¬Mϕ iff ϕ.
The operator M, of course, satisfies the usual laws of the system S5,
together with the so-called Barcan formula and its converse, as well as the rule
of necessitation.
For identity, we have:
(LI) ‚  t = t.
However, the unrestricted principle of indiscernibility of identicals is not
valid in Carnap’s semantics. In other words, the following principle does not
hold for all formulas ϕ:
(I=) ‚ ∀x∀y[x = y → (ϕ(x/z) → ϕ(y/z))].
Instead, we have a restricted version of (I=).
(I=restr) ‚  ∀x∀y[x = y → (ϕ(x/z) → ϕ(y/z))], provided ϕ does not con-
tain any occurrences of M.
For the unrestricted case, we only have:
(IM=) ‚  ∀x∀y[M(x = y) → (ϕ(x/z) → ϕ(y/z))].
The following principle is of course not valid according to Carnap’s semantics:
(M=) ∀x∀y(x = y → M(x = y)). (Necessity of identity)
In the presence of the other principles, it is equivalent to the unrestricted princi-
ple of indiscernibility of identicals. Nor do we have:
(M≠) ∀x∀y(x ≠ y → M(x ≠ y)). (Necessity of non-identity)
Carnap introduced the notion of a meaning postulate to account for analytic
connections between the non-logical symbols of a predicate language. Thus,
suppose that MP is the set of all the meaning postulates of a given language L.
MP is then a set of sentences in the non-modal fragment of L. We say that a
state description S is admissible if MP ∪ S is consistent. Then, we can
interpret M as ‘analytic necessity’ by modifying clause (6) above to:
(6’) S ‚  Mϕ iff, for every admissible state-description S’, S’ ‚  ϕ.
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We also say that ϕ is analytically true iff ϕ is true in all admissible state de-
scriptions. In the modified semantics, we have:
S ‚  Mϕ iff ϕ is analytically true,
S ‚  ¬Mϕ iff ϕ is not analytically true.
Carnap’s semantics for the quantifiers can be understood in two ways. The
most straightforward interpretation is to say that the quantifiers simply range
over individual concepts. Sometimes Carnap himself characterizes his interpre-
tation of the quantifiers in this way and this is how Quine describes it. There is,
however, another more subtle interpretation according to which every individual
term, including the (free) variables, has a double semantic role given by its
extension and its intension, respectively. Each variable has a value extension as
well as a value intension. According to this interpretation – which I think is the
one that Carnap really had in mind – it is simply wrong to ask for the range of
the individual variables. In ordinary extensional contexts the variables can be
thought of as ranging over ordinary individuals. However, in intensional con-
texts the intensions associated with the variables come into play. This is what
explains why the following principle fails:
(M=) ∀x∀y(x = y → M(x = y)).
Carnap’s interpretation of the quantifiers can still be criticized for being unin-
tuitive. The problem is that he lacks a way of discriminating between those indi-
vidual concepts that, intuitively speaking, pick out one and the same individual
in all possible worlds and those that don’t. Suppose that we have assigned to
the variable x as its value intension the individual concept: the number of
planets. Relative to this assignment it is true that:
(1) x = 9 ∧ ¬M(x = 9).
However, there is no object that has the property of being identical with 9 but
doesn’t have this property necessarily. So from (1) it should not follow that:
(2) ∃x(x = 9 ∧ ¬M(x = 9)).
But of, course, on Carnap’s interpretation of the quantifiers, (2) is a logical
consequence of (1). Intuitively, one should be able to make the inference from
(1) to (2) only if the concept assigned to x in (1) is a logically rigid concept,
i.e. a concept that picks out the same individual relative to every state
description.
Thus, it seems that one could turn Carnap’s semantics into a more intuitively
satisfactory one, by requiring that all variable assignments g be (logically) rigid,
i.e., satisfy the condition:
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g(S, x) = g(S’, x),
for all variables x and all state descriptions S. In the language, one could then
have individual constants of two kinds: logically rigid one’s (“logically proper
names”) and constants that are not logically rigid. For the logically rigid con-
stants, universal instantiation and existential generalization would hold, but not,
of course, for the others. Presumably, most ordinary proper names are not rigid
in this strong sense.
3. Quine’s interpretational challenge
Quine’s criticism of quantified modal logic comes in different strands. First,
there is the simple observation that classical quantification theory with identity
cannot be applied to a language in which substitutivity of identicals for singular
terms fails. It seems that either universal generalization (and its mirror image:
existential specification) or indiscernibility of identicals:
∀x∀y[x = y → (ϕ(x/z) → ϕ(y/z))],
has to be given up. This observation gives rise to the following weak, and I take
it, uncontroversial, Quinean claim: Quantification theory (with identity) cannot
be combined with non-extensional operators (i.e., operators for which substitu-
tivity of identicals for singular terms fail) without being modified in some way.
This weak claim already gives rise to the challenge of extending quantification
theory in a consistent way to languages with non-extensional operators.
In addition to the weak claim, there is the much stronger claim, that one
sometimes can find in Quine’s early works, that objectual quantification into
non-extensional (so called “opaque”) constructions simply does not make
sense.1 The argument for this claim is based on the idea that occurrences of
variables inside of opaque constructions do not have purely referential
occurrences, i.e., they do not serve simply to refer to their objects, and cannot
therefore be bound by quantifiers outside of the opaque construction. Thus
quantifying into contexts governed by non-extensional operators would be like
trying to quantify into quotations. This claim is hardly credible in the face of the
multitude of quantified intensional logics that have been developed since it was
first made. I take it to be refuted by the analysis and criticism of Quine’s
argument by, among others, David Kaplan (1969, 1986) and Kit Fine (1986,
1991). Then, there is Quine’s claim that quantified modal logic is committed to
Aristotelian essentialism, i.e., the view that it makes sense to say of an object,
                                    
1 Cf. Quine (1943, 1953a, b).
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quite independently of how it is described, that it has certain of its traits
necessarily, and others only contingently. Aristotelian essentialism, however,
comes in stronger and weaker forms. Kripke’s “metaphysical necessity” of
Naming and Necessity represents a strong form of essentialism, while there are
weaker forms according to which only logical properties that are shared by all
individuals are essential. A quantified modal logic needs only be committed to
this weak relatively benign form of essentialism.
Here I shall only consider the specific criticism that Quine directed in 1947
toward quantification into contexts of logical or analytical necessity. In his
paper ‘The problem of interpreting modal logic’ from 1947, Quine formulates
what one might call Quine’s challenge to the advocates of quantified modal
logic:
There are logicians, myself among them, to whom the ideas of modal logic (e. g.
Lewis’s) are not intuitively clear until explained in non-modal terms. But so long
as modal logic stops short of quantification theory, it is possible ... to provide
somewhat the type of explanation required. When modal logic is extended (as by
Miss Barcan) to include quantification theory, on the other hand, serious obstacles
to interpretation are encountered – particularly if one cares to avoid a curiously
idealistic ontology which repudiates material objects.
What Quine demands of the modal logicians is nothing less than an explana-
tion of the notions of quantified modal logic in non-modal terms. Such an expla-
nation should satisfy the following requirements:
(i) It should be expressed in an extensional language. Hence, it cannot use
any non-extensional constructions.
(ii) The explanation should be allowed to use concepts from the ‘theory of
meaning’ like analyticity and synonymy applied to expressions of the metalan-
guage. Quine is, of course, quite skeptical about the intelligibility of these no-
tions as well. But he considers it to be progress of a kind, if modal notions
could be explained in these terms.
(iii) The explanation should make sense of sentences like:
∃x[x is red ∧ N(x is round)],
in which a quantifier outside a modal operator binds a variable within the scope
of the operator and the quantifier ranges over ordinary physical objects (in dis-
tinction from Frege’s “Sinne” or Carnap’s “individual concepts”). In other
words, the explanation should make sense of ‘quantifying in’ in modal contexts.
Quine (1947) – like Carnap before him – starts out from a metalinguistic
interpretation of the necessity operator M in terms of the predicate ‘... is
analytically true’. Disregarding possible complications in connection with the
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interpretation of iterated modalities, we have for sentences ϕ of the object
language:
‘Mϕ’ is true iff ϕ is analytically true.
Now Quine argues for the thesis that it is impossible to combine analytical
necessity with a standard theory of quantification (over physical objects). The
argument (a variation of “the Morning Star Paradox”) goes as follows:
The paradox arises from the following premises:
(1) M(Hesperus = Hesperus)
(2) Phosphorus = Hesperus
(3) ¬M(Phosphorus = Hesperus),
where ‘Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus’ are two proper names (individual con-
stants) and M is to be read ‘It is analytically necessary that’. We assume that
‘Phosphorus’ is used by the language community as a name for a certain bright
heavenly object visible in the morning and that ‘Hesperus’ is used for some
bright heavenly object visible in the evening. Unbeknown to the community,
however, these objects are one and the same, namely, the planet Venus.
‘Hesperus = Hesperus’ being an instance of the Law of Identity is clearly an
analytic truth. It follows that the premise (1) is true. (2) is true, as a matter of
fact. ‘Phosphorus = Hesperus’ is obviously not an analytic truth, ‘Phosphorus’
and ‘Hesperus’ being two different names with quite distinct uses. So, (3) is
true.
From (1), (2), (3) and the Law of Identity, we infer by sentential logic:
(4) Phosphorus = Hesperus ∧ ¬M(Phosphorus = Hesperus),
(5) Hesperus = Hesperus ∧ M(Hesperus = Hesperus).
Applying:
(EG) ϕ(t/x) → ∃xϕ, (Existential Generalization)
to (4) and (5), we get:
(6) ∃x(x = Hesperus ∧ ¬M(x = Hesperus)),
(7) ∃x(x = Hesperus ∧ M(x = Hesperus)).
As Quine (1947) points out, however, (6) and (7) seem to be incompatible
with interpreting ∀x and ∃x as objectual quantifiers meaning “for all objects x
(in the domain D)” and “for at least one object x (in D)” and letting the identity
sign stand for genuine identity between objects (in D). Because, under this
interpretation, (6) and (7) have the readings:
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(6’) There is an object x (in the actual domain D) which is identical
with Hesperus and which is not necessarily identical with
Hesperus.
(7’) There is an object x (in the actual domain D) which is identical
with Hesperus and which is necessarily identical with Hesperus.
meaning that one and the same object, Hesperus, both is and is not necessarily
identical with Hesperus, which seems absurd.
The following are classical proposals for solving Quine’s interpretational
challenge:
(i) Russell-Smullyan. According to this proposal, all singular terms except
variables are treated as Russellian terms, i.e., as “abbreviations” of definite
descriptions that are eliminated from the language by means of contextual defi-
nition à la Russell. If we let ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ be Russellian terms
having minimal scope everywhere – which clearly corresponds to the intended
reading – then the inference will not go through (i.e., once the Russell terms
have been contextually eliminated): the (EG)-steps above will not correspond to
valid steps in primitive notation. With this treatment of singular terms, the para-
dox is avoided. One has the feeling, however, that the problem has been
circumvented rather than solved.
(ii) Carnap (at least the way Quine reads him): The individual variables are
not taken to range over physical objects, but instead over individual concepts.
According to this reading, the names ‘Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus’ stand for
different but coextensive individual concepts. The identity sign is interpreted not
as a genuine identity between physical objects but as coextensionality between
individual concepts. That is, an identity statement ‘u = v’ is true if and only if
the terms ‘u’ and ‘v’ stand for coextensive individual concepts. According to
this interpretation, (6) and (7) mean:
(6’’) There is an individual concept x which actually coincides with the
individual concept Hesperus but does not do so by analytical neces-
sity.
(7’’) There is an individual concept x which not only happens to coin-
cide with the individual concept Hesperus but does so by analytic
necessity.
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No contradiction ensues from these two statements. The price for this inter-
pretation, however, seems to be as Quine expresses it: “a curiously idealistic
ontology which repudiates material objects”.2
4. Semantics for quantified modal logic in 1957: Hintikka and Kanger
1957 was a pivotal year in the history of modal logic. In that year Stig Kanger
published his dissertation Provability in Logic and a number of other papers
where he outlined a new model-theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic.
In the same year, Jaakko Hintikka published two papers on the semantics of
quantified modal logic: ‘Modality as referential multiplicity’ and ‘Quantifiers in
deontic logic’ (Hintikka 1957a, b). There are some striking parallels between
these works by Hintikka and Kanger, but there are also important differences.
Hintikka and Kanger had both made important and closely similar work in
non-modal predicate logic. Using so-called model sets (nowadays often called
“Hintikka sets”) for predicate logic, Hintikka (1955) had developed a new com-
plete and effective proof procedure for predicate logic.
Let L be a language of predicate logic with identity and let U be a non-empty
set of individual constants that do not belong to L. A model set (over U) is a set
m of sentences of the expanded language LU satisfying the following condi-
tions:3
(C.¬) if ¬ϕ ∈ m, then ϕ ∉ m,
(C.¬¬) if ¬¬ϕ ∈ m, then ϕ ∈ m,
(C.∧) if ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ m, then ϕ ∈ m and ψ ∈ m,
(C.¬∧) if ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ m, then ¬ϕ ∈ m or ¬ψ ∈ m,
(C.∀) if ∀xϕ ∈ m, then for every constant a in U, ϕ(a/x) ∈ m,
(C.¬∀) if ¬∀xϕ ∈ m, then for some constant a in U, ¬ϕ(a/x) ∈ m,
(C.=) for no individual constant a in LU, ¬(a = a) ∈ m,
(C.Ind) if ϕ(a/x) ∈ m, where ϕ is atomic, and a = b ∈ m, then 
ϕ(b/x) ∈ m.
A set Γ of sentences of a first-order language L is satisfiable iff there is a
Tarski-style model satisfying the sentences of Γ. Or equivalently, Γ is satisfiable
                                    
2 Notice, however, that there is an alternative way of understanding Carnap’s quantifiers that
may circumvent Quine’s objection (cf. section 2, above).
3 Here we have assumed that ¬, ∧ and ∀ are primitive and that ∨, → and ∃ are introduced as
abbreviations in the usual way. For other choices of primitive logical constants, the definition
of a model set has to be adjusted accordingly.
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iff Γ can be embedded in a maximal model set (over some non-empty set U of
new constants).
Hintikka showed, what nowadays goes under the name Hintikka’s lemma,
namely, that a set Γ of sentences is satisfiable (true in some Tarski-style model)
iff it can be imbedded in a model set over some non-empty set U of (new) indi-
vidual constants. Furthermore, he provided an effective proof procedure for
classical predicate logic. The proof procedure is by reductio: In order to prove
that a sentence ϕ is valid, one attempts, using the closure conditions on model
sets, to embed ¬ϕ in a model set m. If ¬ϕ is not satisfiable, then every branch
in the search tree for a model set containing ¬ϕ will terminate after finitely
many steps with an explicitly inconsistent set. Thus, if ¬ϕ is not satisfiable,
then the effective search of a model set for ¬ϕ will end with a finite tree that
can be viewed as a proof of the fact that no counter-model of ϕ exists. Such a
tree is of course a proof of the fact that ϕ is valid, i.e., true in all models. In
other words, Hintikka’s (1955) method yields an effective proof procedure for
predicate logic that is complete in the sense of producing a proof of any valid
formula. The method is very similar to the nowadays more familiar semantic
tableaux method of Beth (1955).4
Hintikka (1955, p. 47) points out that there is a close connection between his
proof procedure and proofs in Gentzen’s sequent calculus. The systematic
search for a counterexample of a formula ϕ corresponds to the backward appli-
cation of the rules of Gentzen’s cut-free calculus for predicate logic. As a
matter of fact, Kanger in Provability in Logic (1957a) provided an elegant
effective proof procedure for classical predicate logic based on the sequent cal-
culus that is equivalent to Hintikka’s.
Hintikka’s formal semantics for modal logic. When studying classical predi-
cate logic, Hintikka and Kanger used strikingly similar techniques and obtained
similar results. However, their approaches to modal logic were different.
Kanger started out from the work of Tarski and set himself the task of extend-
ing the method of Tarski-style truth-definitions to predicate languages with
modal operators. Hintikka, on the other hand, generalized his method of model
sets to the case of modal logic. In doing so he invented the notion of a model
system. Roughly speaking, a model system consists of a set Ω of model sets
and a binary relation R defined between the members of Ω. Different versions
                                    
4 Hintikka’s proof procedure does not yield a decision method for predicate logic, since it
does not give us an effective method of finding a model set for a satisfiable formula. If ϕ is in
fact satisfiable, the attempted search of a counterexample of ϕ may go on forever without
terminating.
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of Hintikka’s semantics impose different conditions on model sets, but in order
simplify the exposition, we can say that a model system is an ordered pair S =
<Ω, R>, such that:
(a) Ω is a non-empty set of model sets for L,
(b) R is a binary relation between the members of Ω (the accessibility
relation),
(c) for all m ∈ Ω, if Mϕ ∈ m, then for all n ∈ Ω such that mRn,
ϕ ∈ n,
(d) for all m ∈ Ω, if ¬Mϕ ∈ m, then ¬ϕ ∈ n, for some n ∈ Ω such
that mRn.
Hintikka thought of the members of Ω as partial descriptions of possible
worlds. A set Γ of sentences is satisfiable (in the sense of Hintikka) iff there
exists a model system M = <Ω, R> and a model set m ∈ Ω such that Γ ⊆ m. A
sentence ϕ is valid iff the set {¬ϕ} is not satisfiable.
Hintikka (1957b) sketched a tableaux-style method of proving completeness
theorems in modal logic. The idea is a generalization of his proof procedure for
first order logic. In order to prove that a formula ϕ is logically true, one
attempts to show that there is no model system satisfying the formula ¬ϕ. One
starts out from the formula ¬ϕ and tries to construct a model system S =
<Ω, R> satisfying it, by building better and better approximations to such a
system. Whenever one of the conditions defining a model system is violated by
an approximation S’ = <Ω’, R’>, one tries to remedy this by adding a new
formula to one of the members of Ω’ or by adding a new alternative set to one
of the members of Ω’. If, however, ϕ is valid, every branch in the search tree
for a model system satisfying ¬ϕ will end in failure. The failed attempt of
constructing a model system satisfying ¬ϕ can then be thought of as a proof
that ϕ is valid. Thus, Hintikka was the first to outline how the tableaux method
for proving completeness could be extended to modal logic. Hintikka (1961)
states (without formal proofs) that the systems T, B, S4, S5 for sentential logic
are sound and complete with respect to the Hintikka-style semantics where R is
assumed to be reflexive, symmetric, reflexive and transitive and an equivalence
relation, respectively. Rigorous completeness proofs using the tableaux method
were published by Kripke, (1959a), for the case of quantified S5, and for
numerous systems of propositional modal logic in (Kripke 1963b and 1965).5
                                    
5 In (1959b), Kripke announces a great number of completeness results in modal propositional
logic.  He also notes “For systems based on S4, S5, and M, similar work has been done inde-
pendently and at an earlier date by K. J. J. Hintikka”.
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An important difference between Hintikka’s semantics for modal logic, on
the one hand, and the ones developed by Carnap, Kanger and Montague (1960),
on the other, is that Hintikka allows the space of possibilities Ω to vary from
one system to another. The only requirement is that Ω is a non-empty set satis-
fying the constraints (b), (c) and (d) above. In the formal semantics of Carnap,
Kanger and Montague, on the other hand, the space of possibilities is fixed once
and for all to be the set of all state descriptions (Carnap), the class of all sys-
tems (or alternatively, domains) (Kanger), or all first-order models over a given
domain (Montague). One could say that Carnap, Kanger and Montague only
allow interpretations of modalities that are in a sense standard and disallow non-
standard interpretations. Thus, the relationship between Hintikka’s semantics
(and the one later developed by Kripke) and the ones developed by Carnap,
Kanger and Montague is analogous to that between standard and non-standard
semantics for higher-order predicate logic. This distinction between the various
approaches has been emphasized by Cocchiarella (1975) and Hintikka (1981).
Allowing non-standard interpretations for modal logics, of course, facilitated the
proofs of completeness results, since the logics for logical or analytical
necessity corresponding to the standard semantics are in general not recursively
enumerable.
Kanger’s Tarski-style semantics for quantified modal logic. Kanger’s ambi-
tion was to provide a language of quantified modal logic with a model-theoretic
semantics à la Tarski.6
A Tarski-style interpretation for a first-order predicate language L consists of
a non-empty domain D and an assignment of appropriate extensions in D to
every non-logical symbol and variable of L. Kanger’s basic idea was to rela-
tivize the notion of extension to various possible domains. In other words, he
thought of an interpretation for a given language L as a function that simultane-
ously assigns extensions to the non-logical symbols and variables of L for every
possible domain. Such a function Kanger called a (primary) valuation. For-
mally, a valuation for a language L of quantified modal logic is a function v
which for every non-empty domain D assigns an appropriate extension in D to
every individual constant, individual variable, and predicate constant in L.
Kanger also introduced the notion of a system S = <D, v> consisting of a desig-
nated domain D and a valuation v. Notice that v does not only assign extensions
to symbols relative to the designated domain D, but relative to all domains
simultaneously.
                                    
6 Cf. Kanger (1957a, b, c, d, e). See also Lindström (1998) for a more extensive discussion of
Kanger’s approach to quantified modal logic.
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Kanger then defined the notion of a formula ϕ being true in a system S =
<D, v> (in symbols, S ‚  ϕ) in the following way:
(1) S ‚  (t1 = t2) iff v(D, t1) = v(D, t2),
(2) S ‚  P(t1,..., tn) iff <v(D, t1),...,v(D, tn)> ∈ v(D, P),
(3) S ⊥,
(4) S ‚  (ϕ → ψ) iff S ϕ or S ‚  ψ,
(5) <D, v> ‚  ∀xϕ iff <D, v’> ‚  ϕ, for each v’ such that v’ =x v,
(6) for every operator M, S ‚  Mϕ iff ∀S’, if SRMS’, then S’ ‚  ϕ.
Explanation: v’ is like v except possibly at x (also written, v’ =x v) if and only
if, for each domain D and each variable y other than x, v’(D, y) = v(D, y). In
the above definition, RM is a binary relation between systems that is associated
with the modal operator M. RM is the accessibility relation associated with the
operator M.
Among the modal operators in L, Kanger introduced two designated ones N
(“analytic necessity”) and L (“logical necessity”) with the following semantic
clauses:
<D, v> ‚  Nϕ iff for every domain D’, <D’, v> ‚  ϕ,
<D, v> ‚  Lϕ iff for every system S, S ‚  ϕ.
A formula ϕ is true in a system <D, v> iff <D, v> ‚  ϕ. A formula ϕ is said
to be valid (logically true) if it is true in every system <D, v>. A formula ϕ is a
logical consequence of a set Γ of formulas (in symbols, Γ ‚  ϕ) if ϕ is true in
every system in which all the formulas in Γ are true.
In order to get a clearer understanding of Kanger’s treatment of quantifica-
tion, I shall speak of selection functions that pick out from each domain an ele-
ment of that domain as individual concepts. To be more precise, an individual
concept, in this sense, is a function f, with the collection of all domains as its
range, such that for every domain D, f(D) ∈ D. We can think of a system S =
<D, v> as assigning to each individual constant c the individual concept
{<D, v(D, c)>: D is a domain} and to each variable x the individual concept
{<D, v(D, x)>: D is a domain}. The formula P(t1,..., tn) is true in S = <D, v> if
and only if the individual concepts designated by t1,..., tn pick out objects in the
domain D that stand in the relation v(D, P) to each other. The identity symbol
designates the relation of coincidence between individual concepts (at the
“actual” domain D). That is. t1 = t2 is true in a system S = <D, v> if and only if
the individual concepts designated by t1 and t2, respectively, pick out one and
the same object in the domain D of S.
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The universal quantifier ∀x can now be thought of as an objectual quantifier
that ranges not over the “individuals” in the “actual” domain D, but over the
(constant) domain of all individual concepts. That is, ∀xϕ is true in a system
<D, v> if and only if ϕ is true in every system which is exactly like <D, v>
except, possibly, for the individual concept that it assigns to the variable x. Note
that, interpreted in this way, the range of the quantifiers ∀x and ∃x is indepen-
dent not only of the domain D, but also of the system S: The range of the quan-
tifiers ∀x and ∃x is fixed, once and for all, to be the collection of absolutely all
individual concepts. While formulas of the form t1 = t2 express coincidence,
identity between individual concepts is expressed by formulas of the form
N(t1 = t2).
Kanger’s solution to Quine’s paradox of identity is essentially the same as
Carnap’s. Quine’s objection to Kanger would therefore be the same as to
Carnap: Kanger’s quantifiers do not range over ordinary individuals but over
individual concepts instead. The paradox is solved at the prize of an ontology of
arbitrary individual concepts (selection functions). As in the case of Carnap, the
identity symbol is not interpreted as genuine identity but as coincidence.
Kanger’s response to these (imagined) objections could be along the following
lines: Firstly, the individual concepts are not mysterious intensional entities, but
perfectly respectable functions. Secondly, it is misleading to say that the quanti-
fiers range over individual concepts. If one should speak of the domain of
quantification, that should be the actual domain. But rather than speaking of one
domain for the quantifiers, it is more appropriate to speak of a multiplicity of
such domains. The quantifiers do not range over a single domain but are instead
associated with a multiplicity of such domains.7
One could still object to Kanger’s treatment of quantification in modal con-
texts that it does not provide any means of identifying individuals from one
domain to another. Hence there is no way of saying in Kanger’s modal language
that one and the same individual has a property P and possibly could have
lacked P. That is, neither Carnap’s nor Kanger’s semantics can account modal-
ity de re. This is the same objection that we leveled against Carnap’s semantics.
5. Hintikka’s response to Quine’s challenge: referential multiplicity
Quine’s interpretational challenge seemed to place the advocates of quantified
modal logic in a dilemma. They would either have to accept standard quantifica-
tion theory (with the usual laws of universal instantiation, existential generaliza-
                                    
7 Cf. Hintikka’s notion of referential multiplicity below.
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tion and indiscernibility of identicals) and reject quantified modal logic, or
accept a quantified modal logic, where the quantifiers were interpreted in a non-
standard way à la Carnap as ranging over intensional entities (individual con-
cepts), rather than over robust extensional entities as Quine would demand.
Hintikka (1957a, b), however, rejected the terms in which Quine’s interpreta-
tional challenge was stated. First of all he broadened the discussion by not only
considering the logical modalities and Quine’s metalinguistic interpretation of
these, but also epistemic modalities (‘It is known that ϕ’) and deontic ones (‘It
is obligatory that ϕ’). He then introduced the idea of referential multiplicity. In
answer to Quine’s question whether a certain occurrence of a singular term in a
modal context is purely referential, and thus open to substitution and existential
generalization or non-referential, in which case substitution and existential gen-
eralization would fail according to Quine, Hintikka (1957a) pointed to a third
possibility. According to the classical Fregean approach singular terms would in
non-extensional contexts not have their standard reference but instead refer to
intensional entities, their ordinary senses. Hintikka saw no need to postulate
special intensional entities for the singular terms to refer to in non-extensional
contexts. The failure of substitutivity was instead explained by the referential
multiplicity of the singular terms and by the fact that in intensional contexts the
reference of the terms in various alternative courses of events (“possible
worlds”) is considered simultaneously.
Informally Hintikka (1957a) expressed the basic ideas behind the possible
worlds interpretation of modal logic in the following words:
...we often find it extremely useful to try to chart the different courses the events
may take even if we don’t know which one of the different charts we are ulti-
mately going to make use of. ... This analogy is worth elaborating. The concern of
a general staff is not limited to what there will actually be. Its business is not just
to predict the course of a planned campaign, but rather to be prepared for all the
contingencies that may crop up during it. ... Most of the maps prepared by the
general staff represent situations that will never take place. ... There are for the
most parts some actual units for which the marks on the map stand, and the
mutual positions of the units are such that the situation could conceivably arise. ...
But the location of the units on the maps may be different from the locations the
units have or ever will have. Some of the marks may stand for units which have
not yet been formed; other maps may be prepared for situations in which some of
the existing units have been destroyed. All these features have their analogues in
modal logic.
In this example Hintikka informally speaks of the same units as occurring in
different situations (“cross-world identification of individuals”) and of individ-
uals coming into existence or disappearing as one goes from one situation to
another (“varying domains”).
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Hintikka goes on to explain the bearing of the above example on referential
opacity.
We may perhaps say that when we are doing modal logic, we are doing more than
one thing at one and the same time. We use certain symbols – constants and vari-
ables – to refer to the actually existing objects of our domain of discourse. But we
are also using them to refer to the elements of certain other states of affairs that
need not be realized. Or, which amounts to the same, we are employing these
symbols to build up ‘maps’ or models for the purpose of sketching certain situa-
tions that will perhaps never take place. If we could confine our attention to one
of these possible states of affairs at a time, the occurrences of our symbols would
be purely referential. The interconnections between the different models interfere
with this. But since the symbols are purely referential within each particular
model, the deviation from pure referentiality is not strong enough to destroy the
possibility of employing quantifiers with pretty much the same rules as in the
ordinary quantification theory. If I had to characterize the situation briefly, I
should say that the occurrences of our terms in modal contexts are not usually
purely referential, but rather that they are multiply referential.
This idea of referential multiplicity is perhaps the basic intuitive idea behind the
possible worlds interpretation of modal notions and of indexical semantics in
general. It seems that Hintikka here gives one of the earliest, or perhaps the ear-
liest, clear expression of the idea.
Hintikka’s semantics for quantified modal logic is informally interpreted in
such a way that the quantifiers range over genuine individuals. Thus, Hintikka
has a notion of cross-world identification: one and the same individual may
occur in different worlds. However, the semantics allows individuals to split
from one world to another, i.e., the individuals a and b may be identical in one
world w0 but they may fail to be identical in some alternative world to w0.
Thus, the principle:
∀x∀y(x = y → M(x = y)),
is not valid in Hintikka’s semantics. As a consequence, the unrestricted
principle of indiscernibility of identicals does not hold in modal contexts
according to Hintikka (c.f., Hintikka (1961) and later writings).
Hintikka’s solution to Quine’s paradox of identity. There are two cases to
consider:
(1) One or the other of the singular terms under consideration (‘Hesperus’ or
‘Phosphorus’) is not a “rigid designator”, that is it does not designate the same
individual in every possible world (or “scenario”) under consideration. Then,
existential generalization fails and Quine’s paradoxical argument does not go
through.
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(2) Each of the two names picks out “the same” individual in every world
under consideration. However, some scenario w under consideration is such
that the individual Hesperus in w is distinct from the individual Phosphorus in
w. In this case, Quine’s argument goes through, but Hintikka has to argue that
the conclusion:
(6) ∃x(x = Hesperus ∧ ¬M(x = Hesperus)
(7) ∃x(x = Hesperus ∧ M(x = Hesperus)),
contrary to appearance, is not absurd, since an individual can “split” when we
go from one possible scenario to one of its alternatives. Consider for example:
Superman and Clark Kent are in fact identical, but Lois Lane doesn’t
believe that they are identical.
Hintikka may explain the apparent truth (according to the story) of this sen-
tence by the fact that some scenarios (possible worlds) in which Superman and
Clark Kent are different individuals are among Lois Lane’s doxastic alternatives
in the actual world (where they are identical).
6. Montague’s early semantics for quantified modal logic
A semantic approach to first-order modal predicate logic that has a certain
resemblance to Kanger’s was developed by Montague (1960).8 Like Kanger,
Montague starts out from the standard model-theoretic semantics for non-
modal first-order languages and extends it to languages with modal operators.
He defines an interpretation for an ordinary first-order predicate language L to
be a triple S = <D, I, g>, where (i) D is a non-empty set (the domain); (ii) I is a
function that assigns appropriate denotations in D to the non-logical constants
(predicate symbols and individual constants) of L; and (iii) a function g that
assigns values in D to the individual variables of L. For each non-logical con-
stant or variable X, let S(X) be the semantic value (i.e., denotation for non-logi-
cal constants and value for variables) of X in the interpretation S. Then the
notion of truth relative S is defined as follows:
(1) S ‚  P(t1,..., tn) iff <S(t1),..., S(tn)> ∈ S(P),
                                    
8 Montague (1960) writes: “The present paper was delivered before the Annual Spring Con-
ference in Philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles, in May, 1955. It contains
no results of any great technical interest; I therefore did not initially plan to publish it. But
some closely analogous, though not identical, ideas have recently been announced by Kanger
[(1957b)], [(1957c)] and by Kripke in [(1959a)]. In view of this fact, together with the possi-
bility of stimulating further research, it now seems not wholly inappropriate to publish my
early contribution.”
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(2) S ‚  (t1 = t2) iff S(t1) = S(t2),
(3) S ‚  ¬ϕ iff S ϕ,
(4) S ‚ (ϕ → ψ) iff S ϕ or S ‚  ψ,
(5) S ‚  ∀xϕ iff for every object a ∈ D, S(a/x) ‚  ϕ.
Here, S(a/x) is the interpretation which is exactly like S, except for assigning
the object a to the variable x as its value.
Montague now asks the same question as Kanger: How can this definition of
the truth-relation ‚  be generalized to first-order languages with modal opera-
tors? As we recall, Kanger solved the problem by modifying the notion of an
interpretation: a Kanger-type interpretation (what he called ‘a system’) assigns
denotations to the non-logical constants and values to the variables not only for
one single domain (the ‘actual’ one) but for all domains in one fell swoop.
Montague’s approach is simpler than Kanger’s: he keeps the notion of an inter-
pretation S of first-order logic intact, and just adds semantic evaluation clauses
for the modal operators. As in the Kanger semantics, each modal operator M is
associated with an accessibility relation RM. Now, however accessibility rela-
tions are relations between interpretations S = <D, I, g> of the underlying non-
modal first-order language. The semantic clause corresponding to the operator
M, with associated accessibility relation RM, is:
(6) S ‚  Mϕ iff for every interpretation S’ such that SRMS’, S’ ‚  ϕ.
Montague associates with the operator L of logical necessity the accessibility
relation RL defined by:
<D, I, g>RL <D’, I’, g’> iff D = D’ and g = g’.
Thus, his semantic clause for L becomes:
(1) <D, I, g> ‚  Lϕ iff for every I’ defined over D, <D, I’, g> ‚  ϕ.
This semantic clause should be compared with Kanger’s stricter condition:
(2) S ‚  Lϕ iff for every system S’, S’ ‚  ϕ.
The difference between (1) and (2) corresponds to a difference between two
conceptions of logical truth: Tarski’s (1936b) conception and the modern
model-theoretic one. According to Tarski (1936b), truth and logical truth are
properties that primarily apply to interpreted formal languages. An interpreted
first-order language L comes with a domain of discourse D and an interpreta-
tion function I that gives the denotations in D of the non-logical constants of L.
Hence, the (absolute) notion of truth is well-defined for such a language. A for-
mula ϕ of L is true relative to an assignment g of values in D to the variables of
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L if <D, I, g> ‚  ϕ. ϕ is true, simpliciter, if it is true relative to every assign-
ment, that is if it is true in the intended model <D, I>. Now, according to
Tarski (1936b), a sentence (closed formula) ϕ of L is logically true if it is true
and its truth is invariant with respect to all reinterpretations of its non-logical
constants relative to the given domain of discourse D. That is, ϕ is logically true
if and only if, for every interpretation <D, I’, g’> with the given domain D,
<D, I’, g’> ‚  ϕ. If ϕ is a sentence (closed formula), then its truth-value is
independent of the assignment of values to the variables. Hence, Tarski’s
(1936b) definition yields for sentences ϕ of L:
ϕ is logically true iff for every I’ defined over D, <D, I’, g> ‚  ϕ,
where D is the domain of discourse of L and g is any assignment of values in D
to the variables. Hence, for closed formulas of the underlying first-order lan-
guage, Montague’s truth-clause (1) above coincides with Tarski’s (1936b) defi-
nition of logical truth. It also accords well with Carnap’s definition of logical
truth as truth in all state descriptions, provided that the language contains names
for all the objects in a fixed domain of discourse.
In conclusion, Montague’s and Kanger’s respective truth clauses for L yield,
for modality-free sentences ϕ,
Lϕ is true iff ϕ is logically true in the sense of Tarski (1936b),
(Montague)
Lϕ is true iff ϕ is logically true in the model-theoretic sense.
(Kanger)
Montague’s solution to Quine’s paradox of identity. According to
Montague’s interpretation, Lϕ is logically equivalent with a formula of second-
order predicate logic ()ϕ, where () stands for a string of universal quantifiers
that bind all non-logical symbols in ϕ. In other words, Montague’s semantics
induces a translation from first-order modal logic to extensional second-order
predicate logic. According to Montague’s semantics from 1960, the quantifier
∀x is interpreted as a genuine quantifier over individuals. Free variables are
“directly referential”, i.e., a free variable is interpreted uniformly inside a
formula as standing for one and the same individual regardless of where in the
formula it occurs. Individual constants, on the other hand, are reinterpreted
freely from one interpretation to another.
Montague’s semantics validates the following principles without restrictions:
(LI) ∀x(x = x), (Law of Identity)
(I=) ∀x∀y(x = y → (ϕ(x/z) → ϕ(y/z))).
(Indiscernibility of Identicals)
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In addition, we have: ∀xL(x = x). Therefore, the following principle is valid:
(NI) ∀x∀y(x = y → L(x = y)). (Necessity of Identity)
But the following is not valid:
Phosphorus = Hesperus → L(Phosphorus = Hesperus).
It follows that the principle:
(UI) ∀xϕ → ϕ(t/x), (Universal Instantiation)
is not valid. Neither is:
(EG) ϕ(t/x) → ∃xϕ. (Existential Generalization)
It follows that Quine’s paradoxical argument cannot be carried through within
Montague’s logic.
As far as I can see, Montague’s semantical interpretation satisfies all the
requirements imposed by Quine (1947) on an interpretation of quantified modal
logic for the logical modalities.
7. Kripke’s 1959 semantics for quantified modal logic
Here I present Kripke’s (1959a) semantics with one modification. Kripke’s
paper from 1959 did not contain a semantics for individual constants. Here, I
have taken some liberty of interpretation and extended Kripke’s formal language
with individual constants and extended his semantic treatment of free individual
variables also to individual constants. With this change, Kripke’s (1959a) formal
semantics takes the following form. Let D be a non-empty domain. We define a
valuation over D to be a function V which to every individual term (variable or
individual constant) t assigns a value V(t) in D and to every n-ary predicate
symbol P assigns a value V(P) ⊆ Dn.
A model over D is an ordered couple M = <K, V0>, such that (i) K is a set
of valuations over D; (ii) V0 is a member of K; and (iii) all valuations in K agree
in their assignments to individual terms.
We say that a model M = <K, V0> is a standard model over D if K contains
all possible valuations that agree with V0 in their assignments of values to indi-
vidual terms.
Let M = <K, V0> be a model over some non-empty domain D and let V ∈ K.
Truth in V (relative to M) is then defined recursively as follows:
(1) V ‚ P(t1,..., tn) iff <V(t1),..., V(tn)> ∈ V(P),
(2) V ‚ (t1 = t2) iff V(t1) = V(t2),
(3) V ‚ ¬ϕ iff V ϕ,
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(4) V ‚ (ϕ → ψ) iff V ϕ or V ‚  ψ,
(5) V ‚ ∀xϕ iff for every object a ∈ D, V(a/x) ‚  ϕ,
(6) V ‚ Mϕ iff for every valuation V’ in K, V’ ‚ ϕ.
We say that ϕ is true in M relative to V iff V ‚  ϕ. ϕ is true in M iff V0 ‚ ϕ.
ϕ is valid in the domain D iff ϕ is true in all models over D. ϕ is logically true
(alternatively; universally valid) iff ϕ is valid in every domain (i.e., iff ϕ is true
in every model). Kripke shows that the system S5*= for quantified modal logic
is sound and complete for the given semantics.
Quine’s paradox of identity: Kripke’s semantics validates all of the following
principles:
(i) classical sentential logic,
together with the principles:
(ii) ∀xϕ(x) → ϕ(t), where c individual term (i.e., e variable or an indi-
vidual constant).
(iii) ∀x∀y(x = y → (ϕ(x/z) → ϕ(y/z))).
Moreover the following is true in every model:
(1) M(Phosphorus = Phosphorus).
Thus, we can infer:
(2) Phosphorus = Hesperus → M(Phosphorus = Hesperus).
Provided it is true that Phosphorus = Hesperus, it follows according our modi-
fied Kripke semantics that M(Phosphorus = Hesperus) is also true. This is of
course contrary to one of the premises of Quine’s paradoxical argument. But
on the other hand, is it not a paradoxical result in its own right?
The answer depends on what the intended interpretation of Kripke’s (1959a)
necessity operator is. If it is some kind of logical or analytical necessity, then
the result (2) is hard to swallow. It is difficult, but perhaps not impossible, to
argue that all true identities between proper names are logically or analytically
true. If, on the other hand, the intended interpretation of M is “metaphysical
necessity” à la Naming and Necessity, then (2) is perhaps what one would
expect to hold.
One reason for arguing that Kripke’s notion of necessity in 1959 is not
logical necessity is Kripke’s use of non-standard models. Instead of working
with all models or valuations over D, like Montague, or with all possible sys-
tems as Kanger, Kripke is considering an arbitrary subset of all possible valua-
tions. This feature suggests that Kripke’s intended interpretation of the
necessity operator is not strict logical necessity, but perhaps some kind of
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metaphysical necessity instead. This conclusion is however, not unavoidable:
Kripke’s intended interpretations in (1959a) could still have been some or all of
the standard models. Kripke’s reason for allowing non-standard models, in
addition to standard ones, when defining validity, could have been logical rather
then philosophical. If Kripke, like Kanger and Montague, had chosen to work
only with standard models, the set of valid sentences would not have been
recursively enumerable and there would be no completeness theorem to be
proved. Kripke’s intended model could, for instance, be a standard model over
some infinite set D, where the individual constants, unlike the variables, were
treated as non-rigid designators. Interpreted in this way, Kripke’s 1959
approach would be very close to Montague’s of 1960. The only essential
difference would be Kripke’s use of non-standard models in addition to the
standard ones for the purpose of defining logical validity.9
8. Conclusion
In 1959 Kripke wrote:
It is noteworthy that the theorems of this paper can be formalized in a metalan-
guage (such as Zermelo set theory) which is “extensional,” both in the sense of
possessing set-theoretic axioms of extensionality and in the sense of postulating
no sentential connectives other than the truth-functions. Thus it is seen that at
least a certain non-trivial portion of the semantics of modality is available to an
extensionalist logician.
Perhaps, Kripke meant that he had refuted Quine’s skepticism about quantified
modal logic. Had he not after all done for quantified modal logic what Tarski
and others had done for non-modal predicate logic: provided it with an exten-
sional set-theoretic semantics? In addition he had axiomatized the logic and
proved it complete for the given semantics. What else could one require of the
interpretation of a logic?
Quine, however, was not satisfied. In 1972 he writes in a review of Kripke’s
paper ‘Identity and Necessity’:
                                    
9 In (1959a), p. 3, Kripke speaks of K as representing the set of all “conceivable” worlds. He
writes “...a proposition ºB is evaluated as true when and only when B holds in all conceiv-
able worlds”. This seems to indicate that Kripke’s operator º of 1959 should not be inter-
preted as strict logical necessity. It is very likely that the set of valuations representing all
“conceivable” worlds is a proper subset of the set of absolutely all valuations. Thus Kripke
presumably had philosophical reasons, perhaps in addition to formal ones, for favoring a
non-standard semantics to a standard one. Cf., however, Almog (1986), p. 217, who writes
about Kripke (1959a): “...Kripke had at the time nothing more than “complete assignments,”
and the modality he worked with was definitely logical possibility”.
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The notion of possible world did indeed contribute to the semantics of modal
logic, and it behooves us to recognize the nature of its contribution: it led to
Kripke’s precocious and significant theory of models of modal logic. Models
afford consistency proofs; also they have heuristic value; but they do not consti-
tute explication. Models, however clear in themselves, may leave us still at a loss
for the primary, intended interpretation.10
Here it seems that Quine has overstated his case. Sometimes models do more
than provide us with consistency or completeness proofs. Sometimes they may
also provide us with the intended interpretation. Montague’s (1960) model the-
ory, for instance, gives us more than a collection of models; it also gives us a
translation of first-order modal logic into extensional second-order predicate
logic. Thereby it provides us with an intuitive interpretation of quantified modal
logic that seems to satisfy the demands once imposed by Quine. In this
interpretation, the notion of a possible world plays no role.
Whatever was his aim in 1959, in his later work Kripke’s project is not to
give an explanation of modal concepts in non-modal terms. In the Preface to
Naming and Necessity, 1980 he writes:
I do not think of ‘possible worlds’ as providing a reductive analysis in any phi-
losophically significant sense, that is, as uncovering the ultimate nature, from
either an epistemological or a metaphysical point of view, of modal operators,
propositions, etc., or as ‘explicating’ them.
Clearly, Kripke’s essentialist concept of necessity (“metaphysical necessity”)
simply cannot be reductively explained in non-modal terms. On the other hand,
it seems that Montague in his early semantics did give an explanation of a con-
cept of logical necessity that satisfies the requirements that Quine once formu-
lated.
In his early work, Kanger provided a type of semantics for quantified modal
logic that differs in interesting ways from the Kripke-type semantics that has
since become standard.11 Hintikka emphasized epistemic and deontic modalities,
rather than the logical modalities that had dominated the early discussions of
Quine’s challenge. He also stressed the importance of the notions of referential
multiplicity and cross-world identification for the interpretation of quantified
modal logic. Hintikka’s approach to the problem of “quantifying in” appears to
be – at least for the purposes of doxastic and epistemic logic – more natural and
flexible than the approaches of Montague and Kripke that do not admit the
splitting or merging of individuals from one possible world to another.
                                    
10 Quine (1972). I found this quote in Ballarin (1999).
11 Cf. Kripke (1963a).
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